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"Of All Professions Begging is the Best"
Some Problems in the Study of Professions
Michael Davis
My title comes from a rare version of an Irish folk song,
"The Little Beggar Man". The rest of the stanza is worth quoting
here, since it explains why begging is "the best profession":
For when a man is tired he can sit down and rest.
He can beg for his dinner, he has nothing else to do
But slip around the comer with his old rigadoo1
We can, I hope, agree that, whatever this beggar is, he is not a
member of a profession-in the sense of "profession" relevant to
professional ethics. Begging may be his occupation, trade, or
calling. Indeed, in the most common version of the song, the line
quoted in my title is actually, "Of all the trades a-going, sure
begging is the best". One question I want to answer in this talk is
why begging cannot be his profession (in the relevant sense),
though it certainly is his trade or occupation and may even be his
calling. Another question I want to answer is why engineering is
a profession, when it is, and why its being a profession is
IA "rigadoo" is probably a knapsack (what the beggar is rigged out in).
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important for understanding both engineering and the technology
it produces.
This talk has four parts. The fIrst explains what is wrong
with the classic ways of defIning profession, an inadequate
method. The second part offers two alternative methods, both
"philosophical", explaining why one is better than the other. The
third part works out in detail the implications of the defmition
that the second philosophical method generates. The last part
considers an objection--correct as to the facts-that the
preferred defmition is not ''universal'' but "culturally limited".
1. SociologicalApproachesto Profession
"Profession" has several senses in English-and, indeed,
in most European languages that have derived the word from
Latin. "Profession" can be a mere synonym for "occupation". It
is in this sense that begging can be "the best profession". It is
also in this sense that we may, without irony or metaphor, speak
of a "professional athlete" or "professional thief'- provided the
person in question makes a living by the activity in question.
This broad sense of "profession" is, I think, plainly not the one
relevant professional ethics. Nor is the somewhat narrower sense
(also common in English) of honest occupation, the sense that
allows us to say: "Plumbing is a profession; prostitution is not."
Our concern is the sense of "profession" allowing us to say, for
2
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example, "Plumbing is not a profession; engineering is." Our
concern is a special kind of honest occupation, one that we can
compare to other similar occupations-law, medicine,
architecture, journalism, and so on.
There are at least three approaches to conceptualizing
profession in this special-kind-of-honest-occupation sense. One,
what we may call "the sociological", has its origin in the social
sciences. Its language tends to be statistical. The statement of the
conception, a defmition of sorts, does not purport to give
necessary or sufficient conditions for some occupation to be a
profession but merely what is true of "most professions", "the
most important professions", "the most developed professions",
or the like. Every sociologist concerned with professions seems
to have a list of professions that the defmition must capture. Law
and medicine are always on the list; the clergy, often; and other
occupations commonly acknowledged as professions, such as
engineering, sometimes. Begging is never on the list.1
1 For more on the enormous variety of sociological definitions, see John
Kultgen, Ethics and Professionalism (University of Pennsylvania Press:
Philadelphia, 1988), especially, pp. 60-62. See also the recent exchange
between: David Sciulli, "Continental Sociology of Professions Today:
Conceptual Contributions", Current Sociology 53 (November 2005): 915-942;
and Rolf Torstendahl, ''The Need for a Definition of 'Profession"', Current
Sociology 53 (November 2005): 947 - 951.
3
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We may distinguish three traditions in the sociology of
professions (what we may call): the economic, the political, and
the anthropological. Though individual sociologists often mix
their elements, distinguishing them as "ideal types" should help
us to think. about them more clearly, even in their less ideal (that
is, mixed) forms. What is wrong with all three ideal types, a
failure to understand how central ethics is to profession, remains
even when the types mix.
The economic tradition interprets professions as primarily
a means of controlling market forces for the benefit of the
professionals themselves, that is, as a form of monopoly, guild,
or labor union. The economic tradition has two branches:
Marxist and free market. Among recent sociologists in the
Marxist tradition, the best is still Magali Sarfatti Larson (The
Rise of Professionalism, 1977); among sociologists in the free-
market tradition, Andrew Abbott (The System of Professions,
1988) is a good example. For sociologist in the economic
tradition (whether Marxist or free market), it is the would-be
members of a profession who, by acting together under favorable
conditions, create their monopoly. Successful professions have
high income, workplace autonomy, control of who can join, and
so on; less successful professions lack some or most of these
powers (more or less). Morality, if relevant at all, is relevant
merely as a means to monopoly, a way of making a "trademark"
4
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(the profession's name) more attractive to potential employers.
The success in question may be independent of what participants
in events sought. The economic tradition loves discovering "the
invisible hand" at work, especially, attempts to serve one's own
interest that in fact serve the public interest instead. Like the
monopoly itself, signs of the profession's success may be
embedded in law but need not be. What matters for the economic
tradition are market arrangements ("economic realities"), not
(mere) law.
For the political tradition, however, law is cruciaL Often
associated with Max Weber, the political tradition interprets
profession as primarily a legal condition, a matter of (reasonably
effective) laws that set standards of (advanced) education,
require a license to practice, and impose discipline upon
practitioners through formal (governmental) structures.
"Professional ethics"-and, indeed, even ordinary moral
standards-are, if distinguished at all, treated as just another
form of regulation. To be a profession is to be an occupation
bureaucratized in a certain way. For the political tradition, it is
society (government) that creates professions out of occupations,
and society (the public) that benefits (whoever else may benefit
as well). The political tradition substitutes society's very visible
hands for the invisible hand of economics. The members of the
profession have little or no part in making their profession. A
5
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"Moral ideal" is not, I should add, a mere synonym for
"public service". Though the ideals I just listed are easily
understood as forms of public service, some are not. For
example, the natural sciences typically seek a shared
understanding of "nature" (different sciences focusing on
different parts of nature). They seek to make known the truth
about nature without necessarily claiming to serve anyone.
Discovering and sharing the truth about nature is nonetheless a
moral ideal if, but only if, we all (at our rational best) are
interested in knowing about nature, interested enough to praise,
support, or otherwise aid those engaged in the natural sciences,
even those studying parts of nature, such as distant galaxies,
knowing about which does us absolutely no good (or, at least, no
good beyond satisfying curiosity). That scientists do not seek to
serve us all ("the public") is consistent with their in fact serving
us all. Not the intentions of scientists but "human nature" (what
interests us at our rational best) determines whether the ideal that
scientists serve is a moral ideal and therefore whether science
can be a profession.
Perhaps I can be a morally decent person without actively
serving any moral ideal, but an occupation cannot be a profession
unless it serves one. A profession serves its chosen moral ideal
by setting (and following) appropriate standards for carrying on
its occupation, standards that go beyond what law, market,
16
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of profession and, more importantly, is unlikely to. Sociology's
way of developing defInitions, that is, abstracting from a (short)
list of clear cases a few characteristics common to most or all, is
unlikely to yield a single defInition-or, at least, is unlikely to
yield one until sociologists agree on a list of clear cases
sufficiently long to exclude most candidate defInitions. Today,
only two professions appear on all sociological lists (law and
medicine). That is much too few to derive a widely accepted
defInition. Whatever the utility of a particular sociological
defmition for a particular line of social research, no such
defInition is likely to seem defInitive to more than a minority of
sociologists. Why sociologists continue to generate defInitions in
this way need not concern us here.3
Philosophers who recognize this diversity often try to
patch together a "consensus defInition" or a "useful defInition".
So, for example, the best selling textbook in engineering ethics
suggests that "the following fIve characteristics will be useful in
distinguishing professions from nonprofessional occupations.',4
The fIve characteristics are: 1) extensive training of an
3 For an attempt to explain the attractions ofthe various sociological
approaches, see Michael Burrage and Rolf TorstendaW, Professions in Theory
and History: Rethinking the Study of Professions (Sage Publications: London,
1990), especially the Introduction.
4 Charles E. Harris, Jr., Michael S. Pritchard, and Michael J. Rabins,
Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases, 2nd ed. (Wadsworth: Belmont,
California, 2000), p. 12.
7
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intellectual character; 2) knowledge and skills vital to the well-
being of society: 3) a monopoly or near monopoly on the
provision of their distinctive services; 4) an unusual degree of
autonomy in the workplace; and 5) a claim to be regulated by
ethical standards.5 The sign that the five characteristics derive
from sociology is that they are hedged about with "typically",
"usually", and "often". As often happens when philosophers
derive a definition from sociology, there is no attempt to
compare what everyone knows with what the sociologists say.
For example, while lawyers do have a near monopoly on legal
work in the US, no other profession has a similar position in the
market. Even physicians must share health care with dentists,
osteopaths, podiatrists, nurses, pharmacists, midwives,
chiropractors, faith healers, and so on.
This is reason enough for philosophers to stay clear of
sociological definitions of profession-and, perhaps, to help
sociologists do better. But, for our purposes, there is a much
stronger reason to do so. Few, if any, of these sociological
definitions would rule out an immoral profession-a profession
of thieves, assassins, torturers, or the like. Assume, for example,
that there is enough employment for torturers to form an
5 Harris, Pritchard, and Rabins, PP, 12-13.
8
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occupation. Nothing in the economic conception of profession as
such rules out the grant to certain persons of a monopoly on
torture-with resulting high income, workplace autonomy,
control of who can join them, and so on.6 Similarly, nothing in
the political conception as such rules out laws requiring torturers
to be educated in certain ways, to pass certain tests, to be
licensed, and to be subject to having their license revoked should
they prove incompetent, careless, or otherwise unsatisfactory.
Last, there is nothing in the anthropological conception as such
to rule out special knowledge of how to torture deftning an
occupational community, a profession of torturers. Because there
is nothing in the sociological approach as such to require
professions to be moral undertakings, there is nothing in it to rule
out a profession of torturers. Individual sociologists are, of
course, free to defme profession to exclude torturers (since none
of the usual lists of clear cases includes any profession that
routinely torturers). But sociologists are equally free to defme
professions as predominantly male-because law, medicine, and
other professions on a typical list of clear cases are
predominantly male.
6 For a well-imagined example of such an arrangement of thieves, see Terry
Pratchett, Guards! Guards! (HarperTorch: New York, 2001). Pratchett
describes this arrangement as a "thieves' guild", though, not a profession.
9
The Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, Vol. XVII No.1
Sociological conceptions of profession seem to be mere
collections of characteristics rather than coherent wholes; they
also seem to be somewhat arbitrary in what they collect. So, for
example, sociologists have long equated professions with
consulting occupations (sometimes also called "free professions"
or "liberal professions"), excluding from professional status (or,
at least "full professional status") most engineers, journalists,
nurses, teachers, police, and others who work as employees in
large organizations. When doctors and lawyers themselves
recently began to be absorbed into large organizations, much Wlli
written about their "de-professionalization", though these
professions otherwise continued much as before. Sociologists
have no way to distinguish the accidental from the central
features of profession. That, I think, is reason enough to reject
the sociological approach, even though it continues to dominate
discussion of what professions are.
2. Two Philosophical Approaches to Profession
The other two approaches to conceptualizing profession
are, as I said, philosophicaL They offer necessary and sufficient
conditions for an occupation to count as a profession. While a
philosophical conception may leave the status of a small number
of would-be professions unsettled, it should at least be able to
explain (in a satisfying way) why those would-be professions are
10
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neither clearly professions nor clearly not professions.
Philosophical conceptions are sensitive to counter-example in a
way sociological conceptions are not. Philosophers cannot use
the standard defense of sociologists confronted with a counter-
example: "I said 'most', not 'all'."
One philosophical approach to conceptualizing profession
is (what 1 shall call) the Cartesian. It answers the question, "What
do I think a profession is?" It attempts to piece together in a
coherent way the contents of one person's mind. There may be as
many Cartesian conceptions of profession as there are people
who ask themselves what they mean by "profession". The
Cartesian approach has no procedure for mediating between one
individual's defInition and another's. That, indeed, is one reason
1call this approach Cartesian, its tendency to be solipsistic, and a
good reason to reject it. Another reason to reject the Cartesian
approach is that it yields defmitions as indifferent to morality as
the sociological approach yields. My favorite admits the mafia to
be a profession.?
7 John T. Sanders, ''Honor among Thieves: Some Reflections on Codes of
Professional Ethics", Professional Ethics 2 (Fall/Winter 1993): 83-103. For
another (more plausible) example of the Cartesian approach, see Daryl Koehn,
The Ground of Professional Ethics (Routledge: London, 1994). Like Kultgen,
Michael Bayles, Professional Ethics (Wadsworth: Belmont, California, 1981),
seems to offer a sociological definition.
11
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The other philosophical approach to conceptualizing
profession is (more or less) Socratic. It answers the question,
"What do we-professionals and philosophers---{'really') think a
profession is?" Such a conception must be worked out through a
conversation, a typical Socratic dialogue in which Cartesian Fs
unite into a public we. A member of a profession (so called) says
what she means by "profession". Philosophers, or other members
of a profession, test the defInition with counter-examples,
consider the consequences of adopting the defInition, and
otherwise examine it in the way philosophers typically do. Any
problem so discovered should be fIxed by revising the defInition
in a way that seems to resolve the problem. The defInition is
again examined. And so the process continues until the defInition
satisfIes everyone participating in the conversation. This critical
conversation underwrites the claim that the resulting defInition is
''what we really think a profession is" (that is, what we think it is
after enough reflection).
The conversation need not end with a defInition that
includes all groups originally called "profession". The
conversation may lead some participants to withdraw their claim
to belong to a profession. There is nothing canonical about the
original list of professions. The Socratic approach nonetheless
provides a procedure for resolving disputes, something neither
the sociological nor the Cartesian does. Individual insights must
12
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be incorporated into a single definition on which everyone
agrees. The Socratic procedure concludes only when there is no
live alternative to its preferred deftnition, a procedure that
necessarily excludes individual mistakes and even widespread
but indefensible prejudices. In this respect, the resulting
deftnition is a product of reason rather than individual or social
psychology.
After many years of applying this method, I have
reached the following deftnition:
A profession is a number of individuals in the same
occupation voluntarily organized to earn a living by
openly serving a moral ideal in a morally-permissible
way beyond what law, market, morality, and public
opinion would otherwise require.
3. Understanding the Socratic Definition
According to this Socratic defInition, a profession is a
group undertaking. There can be no profession with just one
member. This is one respect in which members of a profession
differ from mere experts, artists, or other knowledgeable, skillful,
or inventive people. Such people can be one of a kind, working
alone. A professional never works alone.
The group forming a profession must share an occupation
(though its members may be only a subset of the occupation
rather than the whole). Whether the occupants of a certain
13
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collection of job descriptions constitutes one occupation, two, or
several is, of course, as much a matter of decision as of fact-
much as is the amount of hair one must have on his head to
defend against a charge of baldness. To decide whether a certain
collection of jobs is one or more than one occupation, we must
know how similar the skills in question, how much movement
between jobs of different descriptions, how similar the work of
occupants of different jobs, how different from neighboring
occupations the (candidate) "occupation" in question, and so on.
There is usually room for argument-and, often, room even for
more than one good answer. For example, for the purpose, say,
of membership in the Institute for Electrical and Electronic
Engineers (IEEE), computer scientists may count as belonging to
the same occupation as electrical engineers. But, for some other
purpose, say, the study of engineering ethics, computer scientists
may be too different (since they have their own code of ethics).
Though occupations do have fuzzy boundaries, they defInitely
have boundaries. Law and medicine cannot be one profession;
nor can engineering and journalism. The underlying disciplines
are just too different.
According to the Socratic defmition, the group in
question (the would-be profession) must organize to work in a
morally permissible way. If there is no morally permissible way
to carry on the occupation, it cannot be a profession. There can,
14
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for example, be no profession of thieves, assassins, or torturers
(since theft, murder, and torture are-almost always-morally
wrong). Morality thus limits what can be a profession. Some
professions ("professional thief', "professional assassin",
"professional torturer") are conceptually impossible.
The moral permissibility of a profession's occupation is
one way that, according to the Socratic definition, profession is
conceptually connected with morality. There are two others. One
concerns "moral ideals". A moral ideal is a state of affairs
"everyone" (every rational person at her rational best) recognizes
as a significant good. (That the state of affairs in question is a
good is shown by her wanting it-at her rational best-to exist;
the significance of that good is shown by her being willing to
help, in at least minor ways, to realize it.) For most professions,
stating the distinctive moral ideal (roughly) is easy: physicians
have organized to cure the sick, comfort the dying, and protect
the healthy from disease; lawyers, to help people obtain justice
within the law; and so on. Health, a comfortable death, justice
within the law, and the like are goods we all recognize as
significant. One reason the little beggar man can't belong to a
profession is that his conception of begging lacks a moral ideal to
serve; his reasons for thinking begging ''best'' all concern his
comfort or convenience.
15
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"Moral ideal" is not, I should add, a mere synonym for
"public service". Though the ideals I just listed are easily
understood as forms of public service, some are not. For
example, the natural sciences typically seek a shared
understanding of "nature" (different sciences focusing on
different parts of nature). They seek to make known the truth
about nature without necessarily claiming to serve anyone.
Discovering and sharing the truth about nature is nonetheless a
moral ideal if, but only if, we all (at our rational best) are
interested in knowing about nature, interested enough to praise,
support, or otherwise aid those engaged in the natural sciences,
even those studying parts of nature, such as distant galaxies,
knowing about which does us absolutely no good (or, at least, no
good beyond satisfying curiosity). That scientists do not seek to
serve us all ("the public") is consistent with their in fact serving
us alL Not the intentions of scientists but "human nature" (what
interests us at our rational best) determines whether the ideal that
scientists serve is a moral ideal and therefore whether science
can be a profession.
Perhaps I can be a morally decent person without actively
serving any moral ideal, but an occupation cannot be a profession
unless it serves one. A profession serves its chosen moral ideal
by setting (and following) appropriate standards for carrying on
its occupation, standards that go beyond what law, market,
16
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morality, and public opinion would otherwise require.8 At least
one of those standards must be special, that is, something not
imposed by law, market, (ordinary) morality, or public opinion.
Otherwise the occupation (the candidate profession) would
remain nothing more than an honest way to earn a living. So, for
example, what distinguish the professional soldier from the mere
mercenary (however expert and honest) are the special standards
of a professional soldier. To be a (good) mercenary, one need
only competently carry out the terms of one's (morally
permissible) contract of employment, but to be a (good)
professional soldier, one must do more, for example, serve one's
country honorably even when the contract of employment,
statute, ordinary morality, and public opinion do not require it.
The third way that professions are connected with
morality (only implicit in the defInition) is that their special
standards are morally binding on every member of the profession
simply because of that membership. These binding standards (the
profession's "ethics") are what constitute the profession's
essential organization, not its learned societies or regulatory
agencies. But how is it possible for standards that are morally
8 There is no need for the moral ideal to be unique. Several professions may
share the same moral ideal. So, for example, osteopaths (O.D.'s) seem to have
the same moral ideal as physicians (M.D.'s). What distinguish osteopaths from
physicians are their special standards, especially their educational standards
and standards of practice.
17
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permissible but not otherwise part of ordinary morality to be
morally binding on members of a profession? That, I think, is the
central question in the philosophy of professions. Here is my
answer.
Professions must be "professed" (that is, declared or
claimed). Physicians must declare themselves to be physicians;
lawyers must claim to be lawyers; engineers must say they are
engineers; and so on. They need not advertise or otherwise
publicly announce their profession. There is nothing conceptually
impossible about a secret profession, for example, a profession of
spies (assuming what they do is morally permissible). But even
members of a profession of spies would have to declare their
profession to potential clients or employers. Professionals must
declare their profession in order to earn a living by it. They
cannot be hired as such-and-such-say, a chemical engineer-
unless potential employers know that they are "chemical
engineers" (in the special-standards sense). They cannot, that is,
be hired as a chemical engineer if they only claim to know a lot
about chemical plants, to have earned a living by designing,
managing, or overseeing the maintenance of certain chemical
plants for several years, and to be good at it. If chemical
engineers have a good reputation for what they do, the (truthful)
18
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declaration of membership in that profession ("I am a chemical
engineer") will aid them in earning a living as a chemical
engineer. They will fmd appropriate employment. If, however,
their profession has a bad reputation (or none), a declaration of
membership will be a disadvantage (or, at least, no help).
Compare, for example, your response to the declaration, "I am a
chemical engineer", with your response to "I am an alchemist").
Where members of a profession freely declare their
membership, the profession's way of pursuing its moral ideal
will be a voluntary, morally-permissible cooperative practice.
The members of the profession will be members because they
were entitled to be, wished to be, and spoke up accordingly (that
is, were open about their profession). They may cease to be
members simply by ceasing to claim membership.
In general, members of an occupation free to declare
membership in the corresponding profession will declare it only
if the declaration seems likely to benefit them (that is, serve at
least one purpose of their own at what seems a reasonable cost).
The purpose need not be self-interested, though it often is; there
is nothing to prevent some, or even all, members of a profession
entering it, for example, simply to be in a good position to help
others in a certain way. Ifhired (in part) because they declared
their membership, members of a profession will be in position to
have the benefits of the profession, employment as a member,
19
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because the employer sought such-and-such and they (truthfully)
declared themselves to be one. They will also be in position to
take advantage of the practice by doing less than the standards of
the practice require, even though the expectation (justified by
their declaration of profession) was that they would do what the
profession's standards require.9 If cheating consists in violating
the rules of a voluntary, morally permissible cooperative
practice, then every member of a profession is-because of that
membership-in a position to cheat. Since, all else equal,
cheating is morally wrong, every member of a profession has a
moral obligation, all else equal, to do as the special standards of
the profession require. The professional standards are morally
binding much as a promise is.
An occupation "professionalizes" by organizing as a
profession, that is, by adopting special standards; it "de-
professionalizes" (ceases to be a profession) by abandoning such
standards. "Professionalism" is (strictly speaking) simply acting
as the standards of the (relevant) profession require. To be a
"professional" (or "a real pro") is to be a member (in good
standing) of the profession in question-or (by analogy) to act as
9 They are, of course, in position to take advantage of the professional practice
in large part at least, precisely because law, morality, market, and public
opinion do not enforce those standards (or at least enforce them effectively
enough to make following the standards prudent without the additional moral
obligation arising from profession).
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if one were (that is, to act in the way the relevant standards
require or, perhaps, should require). Professional standards are,
of course, open to interpretation. Part of being a professional is
interpreting the relevant standards in ways the profession
recognizes as legitimate, for example, interpreting a certain
technical standard taking into account the moral ideal it was
designed to serve. Conduct is ''unprofessional'' if it is
inconsistent with the profession's standards (properly
interpreted). Since only members of a profession are subject to
the profession's standards, only they can violate them. Someone
not a member of the profession can be a charlatan, mountebank,
or impostor, but cannot engage in unprofessional conduct.
Professional standards may, and generally do, vary from
profession to profession. There is no reason why the professional
standards of engineers should be the same as those of lawyers-
or even architects. A profession's standards depend, at least in
part, on opinion within the profession and therefore change from
time to time as opinion changes. A profession's standards
generally appear in a range of documents, including admission
requirements, rules of practice, and disciplinary procedures. A
profession is organized (successfully) insofar as its special
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standards are realized in the practice of its members, in what they
do and how they evaluate themselves and one another.
This elucidation of the Socratic deftnition is also a
"proof' of it (insofar as a deftnition can be proved). Insofar you
found the description of profession it generates unsurprising even
when, as it often does, it deviates from this or that sociological
deftnition (for example, by not requiring professions to be
licensed or have a monopoly), you are recognizing it as a good
defmition of profession (a practice with which we are all
familiar). And, insofar as the defmition seems to help explain
how ethics (special moral standards) is a necessary part of
profession, it identiftes itself as a deftnition peculiarly relevant to
the study of professional ethics. And, insofar as other defmitions
fail one or both these tests (as all seem to), this defmition must
be "the" defmition of profession.
4. An Objection Considered: Code of Ethics?
We turn now to one important objection to the analysis
provided so far. One of the documents stating professional
standards may be (what is often called) "a code of ethics", a
formal statement of the most general rules of practice. Yet, while
many defmitions of profession require such a code as a condition
of being a profession, the Socratic defmition does not. That
omission is both important in itself and as further proof of the
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defInition. While a formal code of ethics is a central feature of
professions in the United States, Canada, Britain, and most other
English-speaking countries and has been since early in the
twentieth century, few such codes seem to have existed outside
English-speaking countries until after the Second World War. I
say "almost" because there certainly seem to have been some, for
example, the code that the Japanese Society of Civil Engineers
adopted in 1938 ("Beliefs and Principles of Practice for Civil
Engineers"). Perhaps, if we looked, we would fmd many more
such examples.
The use of the word "profession" in anything like the
special-kind-of-honest-occupation sense discussed here also
seems to have begun in English-speaking countries only in the
last hundred years or so and to have spread elsewhere only in the
last fIfty. There is, Ithink, little reason to doubt that "profession"
(in the sense discussed here) is an English invention much as the
railroad engine and parliamentary democracy are-and, like the
railroad engine and parliamentary democracy, has spread to
much of the rest of the world. Every new thing must begin
somewhere.
Yet some non-English-speaking countries without a
(formal) code of professional ethics (or their own word for
profession in our preferred sense) seem to have entities otherwise
much like professions in English-speaking countries. So,
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requiring aformal code or requiring it to apply to something
called a "profession" seems unnecessarily Anglo-centric-as
well as settling by defmition what would otherwise be an
interesting empirical question (whether a certain occupation in
this or that country is a profession even though it lacks a formal
code of ethics). It is therefore evidence for the Socratic defmition
offered here that it does not require a profession to have a formal
code of ethics (or to be called "a profession") but instead
instructs us how to determine by empirical research whether a
particular occupation is organized in a certain way. What it tells
us to look for is the triple connection between occupation and
morality just described. It is this complex connection that
distinguishes profession from otherwise similar forms of social
organization, such as labor unions, learned societies, and licensed
trades.
In many countries lacking formal codes of professional
ethics, perhaps in all, technical standards incorporate the same
requirements a code of ethics would in England, Australia, or the
United States, though implicit in details rather than explicit in the
more general terms characteristic of a code of ethics. In those
countries, the code of ethics may, in this sense, be both in writing
(in technical standards) and still ''unwritten'' (that is, not
formalized as a "code of ethics"). Whether the technical
standards of physicians, lawyers, or engineers in any country in
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fact serve as an implicit code of ethics depends on the attitude
that the members of the relevant occupation in the country in
question (or at least most of them) generally take toward those
standards (assuming the standards to be morally permissible and
designed to serve a certain moral ideal). If, for example,
engineers in Turkey regard their technical standards as
(primarily) external impositions, the standards count as law, not
as an (implicit) code of ethics (whatever their content). If,
however, each Turkish engineer (or, at least, most of them)
regard their technical standards as rules they want every other
Turkish engineer to follow even if that would mean having to do
the same, that is, as part of a cooperative practice, then (all else
equal) the standards do constitute a code of ethics (even if an
unusually detailed one and even if enacted into law}--and
Turkey has a profession of engineering.
I have informally carried on such empirical research for
more than a decade, mostly by asking questions of engineers or
professors of engineering I meet either when they are traveling in
the US or I am traveling abroad. I now have the impression that
some countries have an engineering profession indistinguishable
from the American even though they do not have a code of ethics
or a term for profession not borrowed from English. Dutch
engineers are my best example---or at least were until the Royal
Institution of Engineers adopted a code of ethics. I also have the
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impression that a few countries may lack an engineering
profession altogether. Interestingly, the clearest example of that
is not some underdeveloped country in Africa, Asia, or Latin
America, but one of the most advanced countries of Western
Europe, the birthplace of engineering. French engineers I
questioned seemed to understand themselves as government
agents (even if working for a private employer). They served
"the state", not some independent moral ideal. They understood
themselves as bound by law and morality but not by a code of
professional ethics (as I have interpreted that term). Indeed, they
initially understood ''profession'' to be a synonym for
"occupation" and had great trouble understanding what I meant
by "professional ethics". They initially thought I meant the
application to engineering of moral theories-what philosophers
teach in a course called "Ethics". If my impression of French
engineers is accurate, then professional ethics is still "culturally
relative", not-like engineering or physics-more or less
universal.
Understanding an occupation as a profession has many
consequences both for teaching and for research. So, for
example, if engineering in a particular society is a profession, all
engineers (and only engineers) in that society belong to one
community, engineering. Whether they belong as well to other
communities-a province, company, industry, or occupational
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category ("technologists"), they will have distinctive ways of
working simply because they are engineers. To understand
engineers as engineers, we must study their profession (as well as
their function, discipline, and occupation). Ifwe are to teach
engineering ethics in such a society, we must take into account
not only the substance of their code of ethics (whether explicit or
implicit) but also the special reason a professional has to obey it
("Don't cheat"). The same is true for any other profession.
Notes
Work on this paper was carried on in part under National Science
Foundation grant SES-O117471. Early versions of this paper
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Of All Professions, Prostitution Is The Oldest
(Except Possibly for Teaching)
Joseph Ellin
Michael Davis would have us believe that there is a
Socratically correct defmition of 'profession.' Dialogue will get
us there; he tells us where dialogue (much of it internal, perhaps)
has gotten him. I am not convinced.
There are amateur athletes and amateur musicians, but no
such thing as an amateur prostitute. If you take money for sex
you are a prostitute; if not, you aren't. Hence 'professional
prostitute' is redundant, as 'professional musician' is not. But
there are semi-pro athletes and (no doubt) semi-pro musicians; a
person who gives an occasional concert for pay is not a
professional musician. Professionals earn their living at doing
what they profess, as Davis says, but this condition is not
sufficient to make one a professional: someone drafted into the
army earns his living (during the term of his service) by being a
soldier but is not a professional soldier. There is (humorously)
such a thing as a professional student, but this term does not
describe a student who attends university on a full-ride
scholarship. In this sense, 'professional' describes someone who
makes a career of some occupation, and who thus identifies
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himself with that occupation (independently, perhaps, of whether
he's actually earning a living doing it: a professional student is
someone who never leaves school, not someone who earns
money by studying).
There appears to be a somewhat suppressed difference
between being a professional and having a profession.
Professional athletes are professionals; in fact, this sense of
profession, earning money by doing something at a high level of
skill, may well be the only sense of professional in common
usage. But is being an athlete a profession? My sense of English
is that we don't quite want to allow that. Yet why should we say
that being a prostitute is having a profession, while hesitating to
say the same about being an athlete? But perhaps I am mistaken
about what others would say: perhaps they would say that playing
sports for a living is indeed having a profession. Other than
counting noses, there seems no way to adjudicate this
disagreement, if it exists; and indeed as Davis points out, there is
very little agreement about what occupations are and what are not
properly called 'professions.' This suggests that any attempt to
formulate a common deftnition is unlikely to succeed other than
by stipulation.
Davis says there are many 'senses' of the word
professional, and indeed there are. This fact alone would not
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make the prospect of fmding one central defmition, very
encouraging. Socratic defmition is possible only where usage is
standardized sufficiently to allow the possibility of a common
sense (deviant cases and usages aside). Socrates thought this held
for such terms as 'justice' and 'virtue,' and 'wisdom,' but only in
an extreme form of Platonic realism can we suppose that it must
hold for all or most interesting terms in the language. Davis
dismisses what he calls the 'sociological' approach, in which one
collects actual uses and more or less makes lists of how the term
is used, but appears to give no argument why this approach is less
satisfactory than the Socratic search for a common defmition.
Even Socrates (on one view anyway) did not simply assume there
were necessary and sufficient conditions for every term he
examined; rather, his method is purely hypothetical: on the
hypothesis that there are (or may be) necessary and sufficient
conditions, we look to see if we can discover them. Of course
where Socrates and sociologists differ is that Socrates subjects
proposed defmitions to rigorous examination; his goal is not a
consensus defmition but a consensus that has withstood severe
logical tests. Comparison of linguistic intuitions about word
meanings-sociology-is useful, perhaps necessary, but is hardly
exhaustive of the Socratic method. Nonetheless such comparison
is revealing, and what it reveals here is that, as Davis somewhat
too cheerfully admits, we seem to have no common list of
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professions, at least judging by what he has found among the
sociologists: "Law and medicine are always on the list; the
clergy, often; and other occupations commonly acknowledged as
professions, such as engineering, sometimes" (2). This bodes ill
for the prospects of fmding a common defmition: suppose
Socrates and his interlocutors disagreed among themselves as to
whether courage or cowardice, temperance or dissipation, were
virtues or vices (they all agree that justice is a virtue, but disagree
as to what justice is). Socrates would have to appeal (as he does)
to extra-defmitional consensus principles ('Surely we all agree
that being virtuous makes the virtuous person happy') and
empirical fact ('Is the dissipated person happy? Who can think
so?'). Unless comparable principles are available, the hypothesis
that by Socratic means a common meaning will be reached is
likely to fail, it seems to me.
And it does. Let us turn to Davis' defmition. Professions,
he says, echoing the self-promotion of apologists, serve "a moral
ideal in a morally permissible way ... ," where each of these
conditions is necessary for some occupation to qualify as a
profession. Now the ftrst thing one thinks of here is that the term
'profession' is an honoriftc; we don't want to call anything a
'profession' unless we approve of it. So the ftrst thesis in the
defmition is close to tautological. Close, but not quite, as Davis
wants professions not only to be morally acceptable, but to serve
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'a moral ideal.' And there is reason to think that he wants them to
serve an actual moral ideal, not just a supposed or imagined
moral ideal (he takes pains to explain this, pg 8). 'Moral ideal'
carries weight for him, but it's not clear what weight or how
much, as it seems to take very little for an occupation to qualify:
"a state of affairs everyone ... at her rational best recognizes as a
significant good" (8). Science, he says, serves the moral ideal of
providing us knowledge (assuming that we all at our rational best
want to obtain knowledge); but if that's all that's needed, then so
does farming, so does clothesmaking, so does the construction
trade, and many other occupations: for at our rational best, we all
want to eat, to wear clothes, to obtain shelter. Or so one would
imagine. There is a second disconnect between something being a
profession, and something serving a moral ideal. I think just
about anyone would regard the clergy as a profession, though
perhaps for reasons Davis doesn't give. Where does that leave
those people who think that religion is a pernicious influence, and
the clergy a force for evil, on the whole? There are many such
people; their writings (once) used to be easy to fmd. On Davis'
account, they cannot hold that the ministry is a profession, which
may surprise them. Why should their linguistic practice be bound
by this particular stipulation? And the same observation could be
made with regard to other dissidents. Libertarians for example
might acknowledge that city planning, or public administration
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generally, is a profession, but hold (as they do) that all such
efforts do more harm than good and ought to be abolished.
Then there are those who do not take professional
propaganda at face value. The moral ideal served by the legal
profession, Davis and the ABA tell us, is "to help people obtain
justice within the law (8)." We can accept that this objective is
indeed a moral ideal while yet holding that the objective of the .
legal profession is much other than this and is closer to what 0 W
Holmes once said it is, namely, to counsel clients how to achieve
their ends without running afoul of the law. Davis might counter
that the ideal as he states it ought to be the objective of lawyers,
even if it isn't; but this concession to reality would possibly
require him to revise his defInition of profession into something
more hypothetical. Iwill offer this: a profession is an occupation
where a moral ideal is available, whether or not the practitioners
actually acknowledge or practice it.
Yet this condition is likely to run aground due to the very
uncertainly about lists Davis cites. Surely, we want to say,
teaching meets that criterion and is thus far a profession? Artists,
in all their variety, serve, or could well serve, the ideal of
enhancing human experience, and so qualify? And don't athletes,
actors, magician, jugglers and hosts of other entertainers in fact
serve the (very important?) moral ideal of providing amusement,
relaxation, and distraction from the worries of the day? Any
33
The Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, Vol. xvn No.1
rational person would approve of this, would they not? But if we
are unwilling to call these pursuits professions, or even if, as
Davis presumably would agree, we are not clear whether these
occupations are professions or not, then we are going either to
have to say more about what a 'moral' ideal is, or reject the moral
ideal condition.
Davis' second criterion is that a profession must serve its
moral ideal "in a morally permissible way beyond what law (etc)
require" (7), which he later elucidates as requiring a "special"
moral standard (beyond the law etc). The professional soldier, he
says, (apparently overlooking the distinction between being
professional and having a profession) is distinguished from the
"mere mercenary" by serving his country honorably. He does not
explain this further but no doubt it is true that, theoretically at any
rate, the mercenary is motivated by money and is thus available
to the highest bidder, whereas the professional soldier's
motivation is different, involving love of country perhaps, or a
desire to protect his fellow-citizens. Putting aside the objections
of pacifists, anarchists, anti-imperialists, anti-militarists, and
perhaps others who think that no motivation is enough to excuse
the professional soldier's willingness to earn his livelihood by
killing (and therefore soldering cannot serve a 'moral ideal'), we
can ask why, other than by stipulation, this difference qualifies
soldering as a profession but disqualifies the mercenary. I have
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no idea what soldiers (in Davis' sense) think about mercenaries,
but though. they may disdain them for the reason given, I doubt
they regard them as not being members of the very same
profession, the profession of soldering. So what is the Socratic
line of inquiry which can show them that in this they are
mistaken?
Conclusion. As noted, the term 'profession' is an
honorific; occupations apply it to themselves in order to enhance
their status and thus, income and authority. As an evaluative, it is
unlikely that the term carries necessary and sufficient conditions;
application of evaluatives is in general in part a matter of choice.
Arguments that a certain occupation should indeed be granted the
status of profession are carried on in part by analogy with
acknowledged professions, in part as matters of social fairness
('we nurses are just as important as doctors '), in part by appeals
to social good ('teachers are in the business of preparing the
future'), and, indeed, by whatever means may come to hand. If
these arguments resonate, language will reflect ensuing changes
of attitude. Since criteria of application are at best rough., the
'sociological' approach to definition seems correct. As the
sociologists say, there are several characteristics that are
generally associated with professions. Occupations possessing
enough. of these characteristics come to be regarded as
professions. There is no definitive list of what these
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characteristics are, and hence no fmal word as to whether a given
occupation is or is not a profession. The 'useful defmition'
approach of "the best selling textbook in engineering ethics" (4)
seems thereby validated.
36
The Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, Vol. XVII No.1
Reply to Joseph Ellin's Of All Professions,
Prostitution is the Oldest (Except Possibly for
Teaching)
Michael Davis
Joe Ellin's commentary on "Of All Professions, Begging is the
Best" illustrates both the strengths and the weakness of what I called
the "Cartesian method". Among the strengths is that, without leaving -
his desk or consulting any other person, Ellin has been able to tell us a
good deal about how "profession" might be used, about what
libertarians might think, say, or do, and even about what might be true
of professions. Among the weaknesses of the Cartesian method Ellin's
commentary illustrates is, however, an inability to undermine, or even
understand the power, of what I called the Socratic method. Indeed, his
argument rests on an obvious fallacy. He seeks to move from what
might be true to what is true. That form of argument is a respectable
way to refute logical claims. ("Imagine a space in which parallel lines
cross" is a way to disprove the Euclidian axiom concerning parallel
lines.) But imagining what could or might be is no way to disprove an
empirical claim. ("All swans are white" might be true----or false-no
matter how many red, green, or mauve swans we imagine.) And my
main claim about what professions are (their complex connection with
morality) is an empirical claim (though, as I shall explain, a special sort
of empirical claim). Not all philosophy is a priori; much philosophy,
such as the philosophy oflaw or the philosophy of biology, is
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contingent on the empirical claims (what those involved with law or
biology claim about the practice of law or biology).
My talk was not, therefore, an exercise in lexicography or
language analysis. I was not trying to describe how the word
"profession" is in fact used (its "one central definition", as Ellin called
it). I was not seeking ''the concept" (the most general guide to usage).
Rather, I was engaged in trying to understand a certain use of
"profession" (a conception rather than the concept), the use people
calling themselves "members of a profession" make of the term when
they are speaking carefully about their common project. That is why I
distinguished and dismissed several common senses of "profession"
before reaching the admittedly specialized sense on which I focused.
Much of Ellin's ruminations on how "profession" is used are therefore
strictly irrelevant (however accurate).
Consider an analogy with money. There may well be one
central definition of money, say, "any means of exchange". Money in
this sense includes coins of various kinds, bills of various
denominations, checks, negotiable bonds, and so on. Nonetheless, for
some purposes, we distinguish between "real money" and other sorts.
For example, none of us would knowingly accept payment for our
services in play money (what we happily treat as money when playing
the board game Monopoly), counterfeit money, or even lapsed
currencies (such as the Confederate dollar or Soviet ruble). Though at
least arguably money in the central sense, they are not real money, that
is, money for the end in view, receiving payment. The reason is not that
real money is valuable and the other sort is not. We sometimes refuse
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payment in something that we admit is valuable. For many of us,
negotiable instruments (like bearer bonds) are not "real money"
because no store will take them, though we would be treat them as
money when calculating our inheritance and an economist calculating
the "money supply" would include them. A conception of something
always sacrifices the complete description of usage--the "central
definition" or concept-in order to obtain a term useful for a particular
purpose, the purpose of picking out what is of interest to us then.
Conceptions are therefore always as open to controversy as a) the
purpose to which they are to be put and b) the criteria for evaluating
their usefulness. Like other tools, they are inventions or works of art,
not the linguistic equivalent of a photograph.
What special sense of profession was I interested in? I was, as I
said, trying to understand what members of professions, both actual
members of actual professions (whoever they turn out to be) and mere
supposed members of merely so-called professions (the remainder),
think about the project they take themselves to be involved in-not, I
hasten to add, what they happen to think at a given moment (a fact
about their psychology) but what they think after careful reflection in
concert with others who make similar claims (a fact about their
common conception of profession). So, what people might say is
entirely beside the point. Even what they do say is only a beginning. I
do not, as Ellin put it, simply "count noses" (not even after selecting the
right noses). The crucial thing, what is entirely missing from Ellin's
critique, is what members of professions (and those who only think
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they are) say after such careful reflection in concert (what they say "at
their rational best").
How can I know this crucial thing? My claim to that knowledge rests
on actually engaging in (something like) the appropriate dialogue with
them in classes or workshops, at conferences, at parties, and even in
open-ended interviews.l My dialogue with members of professions has
not been-as Ellin snidely suggests-"[mostly] internal". I am serious
about following (what I called) the Socratic method. One sign of Ell in's
Cartesianism is that he supposes me to committed to Socrates'
metaphysics (along with his method); a metaphysics that guarantees
agreement among all rational persons whether they have the
appropriate experience or not. I have no such commitment. Another
sign of Ell in's Cartesianism is that he cannot believe a philosopher
would actually go about the world as Socrates once went about Athens.
I sympathize. Like him, I was taught philosophy at a time when ''we''
(philosophers) could not see why internal dialogue was not sufficient. If
one can defme "chicken" without asking a "chicken" for its opinion
(something we certainly can do), why not define "profession" without
asking its members what they think they are doing?
The question is not merely rhetorical. The conception of
profession I am interested in is not like the concept of chicken, or even
any of the likely conception of chicken. "Profession" (in our preferred
sense)--like "democracy", "engineering", and ''rational''-is a
conception having an inside as well as an outside. It describes a self-
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conscious undertaking (as well as a collection of behaviors). The test of
a Socratic definition is, it is true, in part Cartesian even when the
definition concerns "profession". The definition must satisfy
philosophical standards of clarity, coherence, and so on. But the test of
a Socratic definition is in part radically un-Cartesian, that is, that those
who seem to use "profession" to describe what they are doing
recognize the corresponding definition as describing their use. While
the internal dialogue of a philosopher at his desk can (in principle at
least) determine that the first test is satisfied, it cannot determine
whether the second is. Anyone using the Cartesian method will almost
certainly miss what is central to the conception of profession that
interests us, the way the members of profession understand what they
are doing. Ellin's method of understanding profession rests on (what
used to be called) "a category mistake"? He has treated a term
belonging to one logical category (conception with an internal point of
view as well as an external one) as if it were a term belonging to
another (conception with only an external point of view).
There is, nonetheless, much agreement between Ellin and me--
and pointing it out should help to clarify the strength of the argument I
made in my talk. So, I now turn to what we agree on, though even here
there are important disagreements.
1 See, for example, my Thinking like an Engineer: Studies in the Ethics of a
Profession (Oxford University Press: New York, 1998), Ch. 9.
2 For an extensive discussion of this mistake in another context, see my
"Liberalism and/or Democracy?" Social Theory and Practice 9 (Spring 1983):
51-72.
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First, we agree that "professional" has a somewhat different use than
"member of a profession". I concluded my discussion of the Socratic
definition of profession with a characterization of professional (relying
on that conception): ''To be a 'professional' (or 'a real pro') is to be a
member (in good standing) of the profession in question-or (by
analogy) to act as if one were (that is, to act in the way the relevant
standards require or, perhaps, should require)." Notice that I offer ways
to extend the use by analogy (in what I have now italicized). So, of
course, I can agree with Ellin that there can be athletes who are "real
pros" in this (extended) sense even if professional athletics are not
members of a profession (in that sense).
To say that professional athletes do not now form one or more
professions is, of course, not to say they could not. All they need do is
organize as the Socratic definition requires. Here Ellin raises the
question whether what professional athletes do or at least could do
would serve (what I call) a moral ideal. I see no reason why not, though
I do think: fmding such an ideal is not as straightforward as it is, say, for
medicine or engineering. Consider, for example, Ellin's suggestion, the
ideal of competing in physical games at a high level of skill. This is an
ideal, but not a moral ideal. Nothing about playing perfectly makes it
rational for a moral agent as such to favor anyone's competing well,
badly, or not at all. Only if one has an interest in athletics to begin with
would it be rational to favor his or others' pursuing the ideal in
question. And nothing in moral agency requires such an interest.
Behind my conception of a moral ideal is (as Ellin explicitly
notes) a conception of rational goods (what goods it is always rational
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to desire). All ideals are rational guides to action in the sense that
pursuing what one considers good is rational (all else equal). These
may, of course, only be "apparent [rational] goods". Some ideals are
rational in the stronger sense. The supposed good actually is good for
the one pursuing it (though perhaps not for others). We might call these
"prudential goods." Certain prudential goods are rational in an even
stronger sense, that is, they are (all else equal) what any rational person
has an interest in. Among these, presumably, are health, a good
education, safe and useful structures, accurate financial information,
andjustice. These (or at least the more important ofthese}-what I
think Ellin means by "rational goods"-is, however, still not
necessarily pursuing a moral ideal. Moral ideals have a connection with
morality that mere rational goods of this sort, what we might call
"primary good", need not have. Anyone's pursuing one of them is, all
else equal, good for others. So, for example, physical strength is a mere
primary good, but public health is a moral ideal (in part, of course,
because Ibenefit not only from not have a contagious disease myself
but from your also not having it). We might usefully picture this
connection between certain primary goods and morality by thinking of
morality as the work of a "moral legislature" consisting of all rational
persons laying down rules binding on all.3 Achieving the desired
distribution of certain primary goods may be possible without adopting
any particular rule. Self-interest may, for example, assure the desired
3'For a fuller explanation of this technical device, see my "The Moral
Legislature: Morality without an Archimedean Point", Ethics 102 (January
1992): 303-318.
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distribution (as it may for physical strength). The distribution, though it
can be an ideal, cannot be a moral ideal. Other primary goods may be
such that achieving the desired distribution, while possible only by
adopting a rule, is best approached by adopting a rule expressly
requiring the desired distribution. This distribution of primary goods
would be a moral requirement, not an ideal. An environment free of
serious physical violence is such an ideal. Still other primary goods
may be such that the desired distribution cannot be directly legislated.
For example, the necessary rule might impose too great a burden (as
universal altruism would), or something about the good itself might
make requiring the distribution self-defeating (as requiring everyone to
share confidences with everyone else seems to be--since universal
sharing would destroy the point of confidences). The desired
distribution of such goods may still be approximated by adopting
auxiliary rules, that is, rules making it easier than it would otherwise be
to engage in activity tending to produce the desired distribution. For
such goods, the desired distribution is a moral ideal. The connection
between the rule and the ideal provides a reason for making supporting
rules part of morality.
On this analysis, a moral ideal is a distribution of goods every
rational person wants enough to accept a significant moral burden in
exchange but not enough to accept the burden that morally requiring
the good to be provided would entail. So, for example, achieving good
health for everyone is a moral ideal in this sense. Health is certainly a
primary good and we generally benefit from the health of others. The
healthy are not a drain on us in the way the sick are, nor do they
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threaten contagion in the way the sick often do. Yet we are unwilling to
require each of us to help the sick, to avoid all conduct that might cause
disease, and to do whatever else might be necessary to provide that
good for everyone. The moral rules therefore include no requirement
that each do what he can to assure his own health or anyone else's, only
such auxiliary rules as prohibit sneezing on others or require us to help
a physician if our help is needed in an emergency and can be given
with minimal cost.4
So, if professional atWetics is to be a profession, it must serve
some moral ideal in this sense. Ellin's suggestion is to consider atWetes
are a category of entertainer. Like actors, magicians, jugglers, and so
on, they seek to provide amusement, relaxation, and distraction from
the cares of the day (by competing in physical games at a high level).
This strikes me as a useful way to define their moral ideal. But before I
accept it, I would want to ask professional atWetes whether they
consider themselves to be providing this good (perhaps among others).
If not, then, of course, the mere possibility of their doing so does not
make them a profession. But for now, let's assume professional atWetes
would accept this description of their work. Amusement, relaxation,
and distraction from the cares of the day seem to be rational goods
(even if not as important as primary goods like health, justice, or
4 This analysis of the distinction between "rational goods" and "moral ideal" is
not new but follows what I said in Profession, Code, and Ethics (Ashgate:
Aldershot, England, 2002), pp. 25-26. As used here, "moral ideal" is a term of
art (a conception). Those who wish to save the term for some other purpose
are free to substitute another. What is important is not the term itself but the
conception it names.
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safety). Still, that does not show that their provision is also a moral
ideal, that is, a good important enough to take on the burdens that turn a
rational good into a moral ideal. Ellin, or more likely other thinkers,
will have to provide further argument before we can conclude that good
atWetes can routinely serve a moral ideal (much less that they actually
5do).
That brings me to the question why any occupation, not only
professional atWetics, should want to form a profession. Echoing much
sociology, Ellin seems to think that "profession" is an ''honorific'', that
is, a term convention makes an honor or sign of respect (whether
deserved or not). "Sir" or "Nobel Prize Winner" are typical honorifics.
Most honorifics simply accord honor or respect (though some, like the
Nobel Prize, come with money or other valuable things). The title
"profession" differs from typical honorifics in (according to Ellin and
many sociologists) somehow guaranteeing (or, at least, making much
more likely) higher social status, higher income, or more authority
(control over one's work). While I agree that ''profession'' (in the
relevant sense) does justify respect for the occupation so designated
(until we have reason to doubt the designation), I do not think the
5 My position on the possibility of a profession of prostitution would be
exactly the same. I see no reason a priori why prostitution cannot be a
profession (one committed to providing "sexual comfort"). Just that possibility
was a subject of common conversation in the Netherlands when I visited in
2007. Of course, those discussing the possibility did not regard providing
sexual comfort for money as morally wrong. Had they considered it morally
wrong, they would have had to reject the possibility of a profession of
prostitution. The list of possible professions will always be contingent on our
understanding of morality. Ellin is right to point out that that is indeed a
consequence of my analysis.
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connection is conventional or that it guarantees (or even makes likely)
anything in the way of status, income, or authority. Certainly, there is
no centralized body handing out the designation (in the US) or setting
the benefits to accompany the designation.
The connection between the benefits of a profession (whatever they
turn out to be) and the designation is more like that a trademark (Bayer
Aspirin or Campbell's Soup) and the goods properly sold under that
designation. The professions so called have had to earn whatever
respect we now tend to give them. The term "profession" may yet go
the way of other terms that once demanded respect but no longer do,
such as "Made in the USA" or "British engineering". The conception
of profession I offered is, all else equal, a reason to expect a profession
(properly so called) to do more good in the world than the
corresponding (non-professional) occupation would. After all, a
profession is designed to do good beyond what law, market, morality
and public opinion would otherwise require. But the design does little
more than give us reason for hope; designs often go awry. Professions
may become "corrupt" (to use Ellin's term), that is, come to ignore
their own standards most of the time. They may simply become lax in
enforcing their standards. But, even if they maintain their standards as
strictly as humanely possible, the design for service may fail for one
reason or another. Their required education may ill fit them for the
work they do (which is why construction managers are replacing
architects on large projects); the cost of their ways of doing things may
be too high for the market to bear (which is why physicians are yielding
many routine activities to nurses, technicians, and physician's
47
The Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, Vol. XVII No. 1
assistants); their techniques may become outmoded (which is why we
no longer have phrenologists); and so on. What can happen to one
profession could happen to all. If the market became much closer to
perfect than it is, professions would probably disappear. The
professions would go the way of guilds. There is nothing in the
conception I offered to guarantee the existence of professions, much
less higher status, higher income, or greater authority than the market
would otherwise provide.
That is just as well. The professions seem to have special status,
income, and authority only when we focus on the "principal
professions", that is, law and medicine. Once we widen our view to
include the great majority-engineering, nursing, teaching, military
officers, and so on-the "honorific" tends to dissolve into the respect
that is due those who set a high standard of conduct for themselves, act
accordingly, and befit society in consequence. If the designation of
profession were primarily a means of "self-promotion" (as Ellin
claims), it seems to be a surprisingly poor means. MBAs and even
plumbers do better without it. That is, it seems to me, a good reason to
reject this "debunking" interpretation ofprofessions-<>ne Ellin seems
to have derived from the sociology's economic tradition (though he
seems to think it a result of his Cartesian method).
Ellin is, I think, right that professional soldiers generally recognize the
mercenaries as belonging to the same "profession of arms" as they
do--in the occupational sense-, that is, as fellow warriors. A
professional soldier will nonetheless distinguish himself from the
mercenary. He will point to the special standards of conduct
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professional soldiers do not share with mercenaries (who are, after all,
explicitly creatures of the market). He will not-as the sociologists
seem to tell us to expect-point to the higher pay of professional
soldiers (since mercenaries are generally paid more), nor to higher
social status (since the social status of both is pretty low and about the
same), nor even to greater authority (since mercenaries today seem to
have greater control over what they do than professional soldiers have).
One of the odd things about the sociological analysis (which Ellin
seems to endorse at the end of his comments) is how badly it fits the
facts of most professions. Those who doubt this should check it out,
starting with any professional soldier he can find.
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